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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

*

Plaintiff/ Appellee
*

vs.

Appellate Case No. 20080243-CA

KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON
Defendant / Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the District Court's denying two motions filed by the
defendant. The first motion deals with the Courts failure to suppress certain evidence
obtained by the State in violation of his fourth amendment. The second motion deals
with the Courts denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.
The defendant posted bail on his State charges. The Cache County jail would not release
him. Two days later the U.S. Marshall's office place a federal detainer on Mr. Swenson.
Mr. Swenson was not released from jail when he posted bail. There rational for not
releasing him is the Federal Government was seeking to detain him. The defendant was
therefore in Federal custody. The State of Utah failed to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Prosequendum transferring the defendant to the State Courts system.
The defendant was charged with ten crimes: one count of possession of controlled
substance, a second degree felony; two counts of burglary, both third degree felonies; two
counts of criminal mischief, one third degree felony and one class A misdemeanor; one
1

count of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; one count of theft, a third degree
felony; two counts of theft by receiving stolen property, both third degree felonies; and
one count of possession of burglary tools, a class B misdemeanor.
The defendant was convicted of Five Third Degree felonies and two
misdemeanors. The Court sentenced the defendant to zero to five years one each of the
Third degree felonies and on the Class A misdemeanor to 365 days in jail and on the
Class B misdemeanor to 180 days in jail. The Court ordered the sentences to run
concurrent.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78A-4-103(2)(J)

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The trial court should have granted the defendants motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, failure to follow IAD procedures, and violation of the Anti-shuttling
provisions. The Court should review its legal conclusions for correctness. State v.
Vigil 815 P.2d. 1296 (Utah App. 1991)

2.

The trial court erred when they denied the defendant's motion to suppress
evidence.
The Court should review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
in a bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a
clearly erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness. See
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d
1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991);
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Vigil, 815
p.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.C.A. 76-6-202 BURGLARY,
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony:
(b) theft:...
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling,
in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
U.C.A. 76-6-106 CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
A person commits criminal mischief if the person intentionally damages, defaces,
or destroys the property of another.
U.C.A. 58-37A-5(l) POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.
A person is in possession of drug paraphernalia if he did knowingly, intentionally
or recklessly use or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate,
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce
a controlled substance into the human body.
U.C.A 76-6-404 THEFT.
A person commits theft if he obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the
property of another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the actor has been
twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or any burglary with the intent to commit
theft.
U.C.A. 76-6-408 THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
A person commits theft by receiving stolen property if he received, retained or
disposed of property of another, knowing that the property had been stolen or believing
that it probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing,
selling or withholding the property, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to
deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said property was or exceeded $1,000.00, but
was less than $5,000.00 or the defendant had been twice before convicted of theft,
robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft.
U.C.A. 76-6-205 UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS,
A person commits this if he had in his possession an instrument, tool, device,
article, or other thing adapted, designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitating
the commission of any offense, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or
3

knowledge th*t some person intends to use the same in the commission of a burglary or
theft.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
The appellant was charged by way of information with ten counts. R. 147.
He filed a motion to suppress evidence of the search of his vehicle without probable
cause R. 094 and a motion to dismiss based upon a violation of the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers (hereinafter IAD) for the State's failure to obtain a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Prosequendum prior to bringing the appellant to State court when he was in the custody
of the Federal Government. R. 090. Both these motions were denied R. 349. The
defendant proceeded to have a jury trial. At the trial the defendant was convicted of eight
counts. R. 237 and prior to sentencing, he re-filed another motion contesting the transfer
to the State Court when he was in custody of the Federal Government. R. 256. This
motion was also denied R. 312.

B. Statement of Facts
1.

On August 17, 2006 Officer Hansen was dispatched to investigate an intrusion
alarm at the Top Stop Service Station in Logan, Utah. R. 349.

2.

As he was parking his car, he noticed a male running towards him (later
determined to be the defendant). He asked the male what he was doing and he
replied he was out for a jog. Officer Hansen walked a few steps and observed
4

that the North door to the store had the lock broken off. Officer Hansen also
saw an axe, a large crowbar, a pair of gloves, and a ball cap. He did not enter
the building. R. 349.
The officer turned and observed a large semi-truck with a car carrier trailer
attached to it. The vehicle was running and he observed the same male
standing on the running board. The interior light was on. R. 349 P. 18.
The officer began to walk toward the truck and the male got down from the
truck and the interior light turned off. The officer pulls out his tazer and
detains the male and orders him to sit down as he was unsure at that point if he
might be involved in the possible burglary. R. 349 P. 19.
The defendant tells the officer to not search his truck. R. 349 P 28.
However, the officer searches the defendant's truck. He shines his flashlight in
the truck and puts his hand holding the flashlight through the open window of
the truck. R. 349 P. 29. He locates a glove between the driver's seat and door
that could not be seen without entering the vehicle.
The officer supposedly saw a blue glove that was similar to the one at the Top
Stop. He further finds a chop saw which was later determined was used to saw
open an ATM machine located in the Top Stop. He then formally detains the
suspect for involvement in the burglary. R. 349.
On August 17, 2006, the State of Utah charged the defendant by way of
information. R. 001. The defendant posted bail in the amount of $57,407.00

5

and was released. R 19. He was then arrested in Salt Lake City, Utah and
missed his August 28, 2006 hearing.
9.

On Augusts 28, 2006, the Court issues a no bail warrant for the defendant. R.
311.

10.

On September 11, 2006 the defendant appears and the Court reinstates the
defendant's bail of $57,407.00 that he had previously posted. R. 311. Cache
County Jail does not release the defendant. R. 244. P5. He is being held
pursuant to a Federal hold. R. 244 P. 5 This federal detainer is not received by
the Cache County jail until September 13, 2006. R. 262.

11.

On September 13, 2006 a hold is placed on the defendant by the U.S.
Ma-shalls. R. 262.

12.

On September 19, 2006 a motion to continue the preliminary hearing is made
and the defendant was transported to the First Judicial Court from the Cache
Coi.nty jail by sheriffs deputies. The Court had not issued a writ of Habeas
Corpus prosequendum to bring the defendant out of the primary custody of the
Federal Government to a State proceeding.(hereinafter "Writ")

13.

On September 21, 2006 the Court holds a preliminary hearing and the
defendant is bond over to answer to the charges. The State brings the
defendant to court from Federal Custody without a "Writ"

14.

On October 17, 2006, the Court heard arguments on various motions filed by
the defendant. The Court denied all of the defendant's motions. R. 349. The
defendant is transported from Federal custody without a "Writ".
6

15.

On October 18, 19, 2006, a trial was held and the defendant was convicted of
eight counts. He was transported from Federal custody without a "Writ".

16.

Prior to sentencing the defendant filed another motion to dismiss because the
State failed to comply with the IAD act. R. 256. The Court denied this motion.
R.312.

17.

The defendant was sentenced on March 14, 2007 and committed to the Utah
State Prison for a term of zero to five years to run concurrent. He was brought
to Court without a "Writ". The Court ordered that this sentence run concurrent
with his Federal Sentence. R. 344.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The appellant asserts that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing the charges
against him. Once the defendant's bail was reinstated by the Judge on September 11,
2006 the defendant was no longer in the primary custody of the State of Utah but is in the
primary custody of the U.S. Marshall. Any further prosecution of the defendant in the
State system should have been instituted by the State either by filing a detainer on the
defendant or filing a writ of Habeas Corpus prosequendum (hereinafter "writ"). The
State failed to do either of these after they relinquished primary custody of the defendant
when he posted bail.
This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah. The District Court was
wrong in not complying with the IAD.

7

Furthermore, the defendant's case was compromised when the Court failed to
suppress evidence that was obtained illegally without a search warrant or probable cause
in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.

ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court should have granted the defendants motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, failure to follow IAD procedures, and violation of antishuttling procedures.

The Appellant Court should dismiss the instant case. There is precedent for
dismissing the charges against Mr. Swenson. In State of Utah v. Friedman, 001917540
The State filed no detainer or writ in order to obtain Mr. Friedman in State custody for
prosecution of his case.
On March 2, 2001 Mr. Friedman argued, pursuant to filing a Motion to Dismiss for
violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, that the State failed to follow correct
procedures in bringing him from federal jurisdiction. See Addendum "F". This Court
ruled that while the State might have failed to follow procedures, Mr. Friedman's remedy
lay in federal court. Mr. Friedman pursued habeas corpus in federal court. On May 18,
2001, the Hon. Bruce Jenkins ruled that the Uniled States has primary custody which
began February 13, 2000 and continues. The Hon. Jenkins directed the State to obtain
writs for further hearings on this matter. The motion to dismiss was re-filed in District
Court after a trial was held and the Honorable Judge Hanson dismissed all the State's
charges.

8

The State clearly failed to follow appropriate procedures to bring Mr. Swenson into
the First Judicial Court of Utah on the instant charges. The State lacked custody over Mr.
Swenson, and the First District Court lacked jurisdiction for every hearing in which Mr.
Swenson appeared without the proper "writ" being filed by the State beforehand. The
repeated transport of Mr. Swenson to court prior to trial also violated anti-shuttling
provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. In any case, dismissal with
prejudice was the appropriate remedy. The trial court erred by not requiring the State to
follow the proper procedures.

A.

The State Violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
1.

The State Had a Statutory Duty to Follow the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which Utah adopted at Utah Code Ann. §§
77-29-5 throi $h 77-29-11 (1953 as amended)(hereinafter? "IAD5') governs the custody of
prisoners whc are charged in more than one jurisdiction at a time. The IAD sets
protocols for i *ansfers of custody between jurisdictions. The IAD applies to prisoners in
federal custody just as if they are prisoners of IAD-signing states. Art. 11(a); United
States v . M a u q

436 U.S. 340, 354 - 357, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1844 - 1846 (1978); See also,

Dunne v. Keohane, 14F.3d335 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying IAD to prisoner with state and
federal sentences).
The State had a duty to follow the procedures set forth by the IAD. The IAD was
enacted for the benefit of prisoners and for the benefit of states seeking to try prisoners
9

held in other jurisdictions. State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989); See,
generally, Mauro, 436 U.S. 350 - 357, 98 S.Ct. 1842 -1845. The IAD applies to all of
the States signing and incorporating IAD into its laws. United States Ex Rel. Esola v.
Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975). As such,
[t]he Agreement cannot be viewed as a single enactment by a single
legislative body. Rather it is a law binding on at least two sovereigns as far
as this case is concerned. Rights arising under the Agreement flow from
the joint actions of both of the party jurisdictions.
Id. at 835.

The IAD addresses very serious problems which prevailed under the
previous informal and varying state practices with respect to detainers. Not
only did the former detainer practices result in serious infringement of
prisoners' rights, but they also substantially impeded prison official's
ability to use the period of incarceration to rehabilitate prisoners.
United States Ex Rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 592 F.Supp. 1423, 1430 (N.D. 111. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 690, cert denied 474 U.S. 1069, 106 S.Cl. 828 (1985)
(citations omitted).
Besides the State's duties as a signing state to follow the IAD procedures, the
State's own statutes require adherence to IAD procedures.
All courts, departments, agencies, officers and employees of this state
and its political subdivisions are hereby directed to enforce the agreement
on detainers and to cooperate with one another and with other party states
in enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-7.
The IAD makes it relatively easy for officials in an IAD-signing state to obtain, for
prosecution, a prisoner from another IAD-signing state. The IAD sets out requirements
for states seeking to "borrow" a prisoner in the custody of one state (or in federal
10

custody) for prosecution in another state (or in federal court). Rather than reprinting the
IAD, a copy is hereto attached as Addendum "G." The IAD provides that any state
where there is an untried Information pending against the prisoner of another state or the
federal government, it is entitled to have the prisoner made available for prosecution.
IAD Art. IV(a). First, the state seeking jurisdiction (the "receiving state55) must file an
Information. IAD, Art. 111(a). Then, the receiving state must lodge a detainer against the
prisoner. IAD, Art. 111(a). The receiving state may alternatively file writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum in order to obtain the prisoner. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 362 - 365.
The original jurisdiction, the "sending state,55 where the prisoner is serving a sentence
must deliver the prisoner with written notice of his request for final disposition and a
certificate showing how much time the prisoner has left on his original sentence. Id.
When the prisoner is served with the detainer he is given notice of the detainer and
of his right to a speedy disposition and is provided with forms to give notice to the
prosecutor of the receiving state of his request for disposition within one hundred and
eighty (180) days. IAD Art. 111(a). The warden is to inform the prisoner of all detainers
and of his right to request final disposition within 180 days. IAD Art. III(c). The
sending state shall send along with the prisoner's disposition request a certificate showing
how much time is left on the prisoner's sentence in the sending state. Id. The prisoner's
request for disposition consents to have his person produced in the court where the
detainer and untried information was filed. IAD Art. 111(e). Trial is to be commenced
within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the prisoner arriving in the receiving state
or the case must be dismissed, although continuances may be granted. IAD Art. IV(c). If
11

the receiving tate does not conduct trial prior to returning the prisoner to the sending
state, the untried information in the receiving state shall be dismissed with prejudice.
IAD Art. IV(e).
Article V sets forth means by which the IAD is enforced. It reiterates the receiving
states9 rights to obtain prisoners (IAD Art. V(a)) and sets forth the proper way to send the
various documents. Article V further provides that where the receiving state refuses or
fails to accept temporary custody of the prisoner, or where the case is not brought to trial
within the Art. Ill or Art. IV time limits, the information is to be dismissed with
prejudice. IAD Art. V(c). During the time that the receiving state conducts its trial, the
prisoner's sentence in the sending state continues to run. IAD Art. V(f). Courts are to
liberally construe the IAD "so as to effectuate its purposes." IAD Art. IX.
Following the IAD procedures is the ONLY way that a prisoner may be brought
from one jurisdiction to answer charges in another jurisdiction. In United States v.
Sorrell the Eastern District of Pennsylvania said:
We see no room for doubt that at least in this circuit, the Agreement is
the exclusive method for transfer of a state prisoner to another state
(including, under the Agreement, the United States) for any phase of the
prosecution in the transferee state.
United States v. SorrelK 413 F.Supp. 138, 140, (E.D. Perm. 1976), affd. 562 F.2d 227,
cert, denied 436 U.S. 949, 98 S.Ct. 2858.
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In United States Ex Rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d at 832, a prisoner was
transferred between state and federal jurisdictions "by unspecified procedures." In
Esola, some but not all of the transfers were accomplished by means of writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Id. at 836. In ruling that the IAD's antishuttling provisions applied to the Esola defendant, the Third Circuit ruled that the
IAD provides the exclusive means of transferring prisoners between jurisdictions.
Esola at 837; followed, Adams v. Cuvler, 592 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that prisoners entitled to pre-existing procedural protections in addition to
IAD) aff d Cuvler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981).
In an exhaustive review of federal cases, many courts have excused various
procedural failures for various reasons, but no court has ever excused a complete
failure by the receiving state to file a detainer or obtain a writ of habeas corpus
prior to obtaining a prisoner for prosecution of untried charges.
The Utah Supreme Court rulings also require the State to comply with the
IAD. In State v. Stilling, the Utah Supreme Court held that the where the trial
court ordered a prisoner from Oregon returned to Oregon (even though the State
had filed a detainer), the return was proper because Salt Lake County "was
required to comply with IAD provisions," and it had never previously "sought nor
received authority of the Oregon officials to dispose of the charges." Stilling, 770
P.2d at 142.

2.

The State Did Not Follow IAD Procedures.
13

In the instant case, the State failed to follow IAD protocols. When the State
arrested Mr. Swenson in 2006, he was properly in the State's custody. However,
when his bail was reinstated he should have been released from jail. However the
U.S. Marshall placed a hold on him. At this point in time he is now in primary
custody of the Federal Government.
The State failed to follow the IAD in several ways. First, when the federal
government sought jurisdiction over Mr. Swenson for prosecution of the burglary
case, the State failed to file the Art. Ill required certificate showing the amount of
time left on his State sentence. The State failed to file any detainer to secure Mr.
Swenson r?turn. The State continued to bring Mr. Swenson to Court on the instant
charges agiinst Mr. Swenson but did not ever file any detainer against him or
obtain a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to obtain him from federal
custody.

B.

This Court Should Dismiss This Action.
Dismissal is a proper remedy for failure to follow IAD procedures. The IAD

directs dismissal with prejudice anytime a receiving state fails to bring a case to
trial within IAD time limits (IAD Art. 111(a) and Art. IV(c)), fails to accept
temporary custody (IAD Art. V(c)), or where the prisoner is returned to the
sending state without trial (IAD Art. IV(e) - this is the "anti-shuttling" provision).
These proA isions shows legislative intent that IAD-signing states follow IAD
procedures and that dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate procedure when the
14

receiving state fails to follow IAD procedures. Further, this Court may not have
had jurisdiction to proceed on this matter.
The IAD provides in statute two separate reasons for dismissing this action.
First, by failing to follow IAD procedures, the State effectively failed to accept
legitimate temporary custody of Mr. Swenson. The State's failure to file any
detainer or obtain a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum amounts to a waiver
of jurisdiction or a procedural defect tantamount to such a waiver. The State
lacked proper jurisdiction to try the instant case because the State failed to ever get
authority from the federal government to transfer Mr. Swenson into the State's
temporary custody for resolution of these charges. C£, Gibson v. Morris, 646
P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1982).
The State could never have reasonably expected to keep primary custody
over Mr. Swenson after delivering him to federal custody. While a prisoner is
made available for trial in the receiving state, his original sentence in the sending
state continues to run. IAD Art. V(f). A "prisoner cannot be required to serve his
sentence in installments." Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982) (citing
Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) and White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788
(10th Cir. 1930)). In Shields v. Beto. 370 F.2d, 1005 - 1006, the lack of the
sending state's interest in the prisoner exhibited by the sending state's failure to
file a detainer was deemed a pardon and waiver of jurisdiction. Where the sending
State in the instant case relinquished custody to the federal government for trial
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but filed no detainer to secure Mr. Swenson's return, his release to federal custody
amounted to a waiver of jurisdiction.
Even where IAD violations do not quite rise to the level of jurisdictional
defects, "they still resemble jurisdictional defects, because they go not to the
question of how a defendant should be tried, but instead to the question of whether
the defendant should be tried at all." U.S. Ex Rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 592
F.Supp. at 1430. The Court should have dismissed this case because 1he case
should never have gone forward without the State following the statutorily
mandated procedures for bringing Mr. Swenson to court.
If the State claims that somehow the IAD does not apply to this case, then
this Court should wonder skeptically about what legal mechanism brought Mr.
Swenson into this Court.
In the Friedman case, Judge Jenkins ruled that Mr. Friedman has been in
federal custody since February 2000, legally, he was not here and the pretrial and
trial appearances were, for all legal purposes, an illusion. All the court
appearances for Mr. Swenson, for all legal purposes, are an illusion.
Second, the State violated on numerous occasions the IAD Art. IV(e) antishuttling provisions. Article IV(e) states that where a prisoner is taken from the
sending state to the receiving state and returned without trial that the receiving
state's information shall be dismissed with prejudice. IAD Art. IV(e). See also,
Esola and Sorrell. Even a one-day transport from one sovereign's custody to
another, without trial, violates anti-shuttling provisions and merits dismissal
16

with prejudice. United States v. Schrum, 638 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1981). Given
that Mr. Swenson was legally in the custody of the federal government, the State's
numerous custodial transports to this Court for pretrial hearings (arraignment, roll
call, preliminary hearing, district court arraignment and motion hearings) violate
the anti-sirittling provisions in that Mr. Swenson was transported in the State's
custody without trial and returned to federal custody.
This Court should also dismiss this case simply because the State violated
the IAD. In United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1990), the defendant was
in custody of the State of Oregon when the United States placed a detainer upon
him. The Oregon jailer did not understand the instructions on the IAD detainer
forms with the result that the prisoner was unable to file his request for speedy
trial, but was told that he had. Id. at 623. Because of the federal detainer, Reed
was denied access to certain programs in the Oregon prison. Id. Although the
federal government failed to comply with the IAD time limits, the trial court
initially denied Reed's motion for dismissal because he had not filed the requisite
speedy trial dismissal along with receipt of his detainer, as the IAD requires. Id.
The Ninth Circuit ruled:
Article IX of the Act states, "[t]his agreement shall be liberally
construed so as to effectuate its purposes." Because of the severity
of the remedy, a prisoner must strictly comply with the formal notice
requirements of the Act... .Nevertheless, in cases where the
government has failed to meet its obligations, and the prisoner has
attempted, but through no fault of her own failed to comply with the
technical requirements of the Act, the IAD's remedial provisions
still apply.
U.S. v. Reed, 910 F.2d at 624, citations omitted
17

In the instant case, the appellant was brought to Salt Lake City's Third District
Court for prosecution. Though his custody status has not changed since September
13, 2006, the Salt Lake prosecutor properly filed a motion to transport. The
District Judge ordered Writ of Habeus Corpus Ad Prosequendum (See See
Addendum "D" Case No.061906125), which clearly States "Swenson" is in
"custody and control of the Attorney General of the United States."
The appellant can only reason the there is some mandate that caused the
Salt Lake City's Third District Court prosecutor to file a motion to obtain this writ,
presumably to obtain legal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would seem certain that
the Cache County Prosecutor would be bound by the same set of laws mandating
that he too must acquire legal jurisdiction before prosecuting the same defendant,
Mr. Swenson.
On September 17, 2006, even after the appellant filed a pre-trial motion to
dismiss for violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, the appellant re-filed
the Motion and stated that the had State failed to obtain jurisdiction over the
appellant in order to prosecute him for the offense. To the appellant's dismay, the
State continued to demonstrate its indifference to the rules, by bringing him to
stand trial on both September 18 and 19,2006. If one is to rely on Lowery V.
Estelle, 696 F.2d 333 (5th cir. 1983) They must conclude the States failure to
obtain custody of the defendant, before conducting a trial, was a violation of due
process under the 5 and 14 amendments.
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The trial court denied the abovementioned motion, stating he didn't see
how bail relinquished custody. The appellant believes that Addenda "B" and "D"
of this motion, provided the trial court with ample evidence of the defendant's
Federal custody, to not only grant the motion, but to reconsider his ruling on the
above mentioned pre-trial motion.
IL

The trial court erred when they denied the defendant's motion
to suppress evidence.

The trial court erred when it failed to suppress evidence obtained from the
defendant's truck linking him to the burglary when the officer had no probable
cause or permission to search the vehicle. Mr. Swenson was detained when the
officer search his vehicle without his permission.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution generally requires
law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant before conducting a search. See U.S.
Constitution Amendment IV. However, there is one exception to this general rule.
It is known as the "automobile exception". If a car is readily mobile and probable
cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits
police to search the vehicle without more cause. Marylane v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465,
467 (1999). In Mr. Swenson's case there was no dispute that the defendant's
vehicle was mobile, and therefore the resolution of the motion depended upon
whether the officer had probable cause to believe his car contained evidence
linking him to the burglary before searching it. It is the appellant's contention that
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the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his vehicle without
probable cause.
The officer did not have probable cause to search the vehicle based merely
on the fact that he had seen some burglar tools and gloves at the Top Stop.
Probable cause requires a belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances
known to the seizing authority. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986).
Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that
the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that certain items may be contraband or ...useful as evidence of a crime; it
does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than
false. A practical, non-technical probability that incriminating evidence is
involved is all that is required.... The evidence thus collected must be seen and
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
The validity of the probable cause determination is made from the objective
standpoint of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer... guided by his
experience and training. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 id. The automobile exception
only applies to searches of vehicles supported by probable cause. The officer's
reasonable suspicions only authorize him at that time to further detain the vehicles
occupants and investigate the circumstances more fully in an effort to confirm or
dispel his suspicions. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
The officer admits he is not sure whether the person he detained had
anything to do with the burglary. However, he still entered the appellant's truck in
order to find evidence linking him to the burglary. The officer should have waited
and followed the proper procedures for his investigation rather than illegally
20

searching the appellant's vehicle without probable cause. All items found in the
truck should have been excluded from evidence. The trial court should have
suppressed this evidence. Wherefore the Appellant requests that he be given a
new trial and the evidence obtained from the truck be excluded from his new trial.

CONCLUSION
The State effectively kidnapped Mr. Swenson to bring him into State
custody. One wonders what this Court's response would be if the U.S. Marshal's
office walked into the Cache County Jail without papers, authorization, or any sort
of permission and abducted a prisoner to answer charges in federal court. The trial
court should not have ignored established federal and state statutes and case law.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Swenson respectfully requests this Court overturn
the trial court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss.
The appellant contends the trial court erred by not following the Federal
and State laws requiring a sovereign to follow certain procedures to obtain custody
of a defendant from another sovereign, regardless of whether the defendant is a
pre-trial, pre-sentence, or even a parole violator detainee. Federal and State statute
mandates some vehicle, besides kidnapping, for this purpose. The court needs to
reconcile, why the Third District felt the need to obtain a writ while the First
District did not.
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Furthermore, the trial court erred when they allowed into evidence the
items located in the defendant's truck because they had no probable cause to
search the vehicle and did not have the defendant's permission to do so.

DATED this

/d~

day of September, 2008
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT postage prepaid to the Attorney General's Office, 160
East 300 South, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
DATED this I6 day of
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ADDENDUM A
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In the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff(s),

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case Number: 061100748 FS

KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON,
Defendant(s).

JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction filed on December 1, 2006. The record should reflect that on the 19th day of
October 2006, the Defendant was convicted by a jury of his peers of two counts of burglary, two
counts of criminal mischief, two counts of theft, and one count of unlawful possession of
burglary tools. Thereafter, the Defendant filed the instant motion.
The matter was set for sentencing on December 4, 2006 and the Defendant's motion
intervened. The Court has now received the motion, the State's response and the Defendant's
reply. The motion is denied.
Sentencing in this matter is set for the 5th of March, 2007 at 1:30 p.m.
Dated this 22^

d ay

of ^bY\JW\,

2ktfk
BY THE COURT

ourt Judge

2007-02-22/GJ]7ts

-1-

n

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 061100748 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

NAME
DAVID M PERRY
Attorney DEF
14 W 100 N
LOGAN, UT 84321
JAMIE M SWINK
Attorney PLA
199 N MAIN
LOGAN UT 84321

^ > day of V^h^Aavvj , 2ccq^Deputy Courts Clerk
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U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Justice
United Stales Marshals Service

DETAINER
BASED ON VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND/OR SUPERVISED RELEASE
UNITED STATES MARSHAL
DISTRICT OF

Please

TO:

type or print

UTAH

neatly;

CACHE COUNTY JAIL
ATTN: BOOKING/DETAINERS
1225 W VALLEY VIEW, STE #100
LOGAN. UT 84321

DATE: SEPTEMBER /, 2C06
SUBJECT: SWENSON, KENDALL ROSSEL
AKA:
DOB/SSN: 03/28/63
USMS#:
CR#:

07002-081
2:03CR135PGC

Please accept this Detainer against the above-named subject who is currently in your custody. The United Stales
District Court for the
District of
UTAH
has issued an arrest
w a r r a n t charging the subject with violation of the conditions of probation a n d / o r supervised release.
Prior to the subject's release from your custody, please notify this office at once so that we may assume custody if
necessary. If ihe subject is transferred from your custody to another detention facility, we request that you forward
our Detainer to said facility at the time of transfer and advise this office as soon as possible.
The notice and speedy trial requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act do N O T applv to this
Detainer, which is based on a F e d e r a l probation/supervised release violation w a r r a n t .
Please acknowledge receipt of this Detainer, in addition, piease provide one copy of the Detainer to the subject
and return one '*opy of the Detainer to this office in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.

Very truly yours,
RANDALL D . ANDERSON
United States Marshal

BY: LAURA JOHNSON /
INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH SPECI
(801)524-3404
( 8 0 J ) 5 2 4 - 5 1 3 4 FAX

PRIOR , DmOS'S ARK OBSOLETE A\'D NOT TO BE USED

FormUSM-16d
Est 11/98

ADDENDUM C
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Case No: 061100748
Date:
Sep 12, 2006

10. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor
HEARING
COUNT: 2:34
Court calls the case. Warrant is recalled. Cache County Jail has
Federal Marshall hold. Bail is re-instated for $57,000.00.
Preliminary Hearing is set for 09/19/06® 11:00.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 09/19/2006
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Location: COURTROOM 5
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
13 5 NORTH 100 WEST
LOGAN, UT 84321
before Judge GORDON J LOW
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Transcript of Videotape

vs
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KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON,
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Transcript of Motion to Continue Preliminary Hearing.
Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding
First District Court Courthouse
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September 19, 2006
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THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Kendall

2

Swenson.

3

hearing this morning.

4

Rosell

This matter is on the calendar for a preliminary

The charges against the defendant are possession or use

5

of a controlled substance in a drug free zone with priors, a

6

first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code

7

58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) .

8

about the 16th of August, 2006, having been previously

9

convicted of unlawful possession or use of a controlled

section

That charge is that the defendant, on or

10

substance, did knowingly or intentionally possess or use

11

methamphetamine, a controlled substance, within a thousand

12

feet of a school.

13

Counts two and three charge burglary, that on or about

14

the same date and place as count one the defendant did enter

15

and remain unlawfully in a building, or a portion of a

16

building, with the intent to commit a felony.

17

Counts four and five charge criminal mischief,

third

18

degree felonies, in violation of 76-6-106(2) (c) (d), that he

19

did on the same date and place intentionally damaqe, deface

20

or destroy the property of another and that the actor's

21

conduct caused or was intended to cause pecuniary loss in

22

excess of a thousand dollars but less than $5,000.
I

23

Count six charges possession of drug paraphernalia, a

24

class A misdemeanor, in violation of 58-37a-5 (1) .

Count

25

three -- excuse me, count seven charges theft, a third degree
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1

felony, in violation of 76-6-404.

That the defendant did on

2

or about the same date and place exercise

3

control over the property of another with the intent to

4

deprive the owner thereof, and the actor had twice before

5

been convicted of theft or any robbery or any burglary with

6

intent to commit a theft.

unauthorized

7

Counts eight and nine charge receiving stolen property,

8

both third degree felonies, both on the same date and place

9 J as one through seven.

They charge that the

defendant

10

received or retained or disposed of the property of anothei

11

knowing that the property had been stolen, or believing it

12

had probably been stolen or concealed, sold, wilhheld or

13

aided in concealing, selling, withholding the property

14

knowing that the property had been stolen and intending tc

15

deprive the owner thereof.

16

exceeded a thousand dollars but was less than $5,000.

17

again, he had been twice before convicted of theft.

18 J

And the value of that property

Count ten charges unlawful possession of buiglary

And,

tools,

19 J a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 76-6-202.
20
21

Those are the charges against the defendant.

Are both

sides ready to proceed 9

22

MR. SWINK:

The state is, Your Honor.

23

MR. PERRY:

Your Honoi, Mr. Swenson would

24

have a continuance of this hearing.

25

here the court reinstated his bond and the jail,

like to

The last time we were
though, i-
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1

not acknowledging that order.

2

post another $57,000 bail.

3

hold on him and he wants to confer with his federal attorney,

4

and he hasn't had an opportunity to do so, to see what

5

these charges may have on his federal charge.

6

They're saying he still has to

He does have -- there's a federal

impact

For those reasons we are asking the court to maybe

7

reissue its order reinstating the bond.

8

the warrant got issued.

9

and we'd just like a continuance, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

said.

12

posted that bond?

He was in jail when

He's not prepared

to proceed

today

Let me see if I understand what you've

This court reinstated the bond of $57,000.

Has he

13

MR. PERRY:

Yeah.

He posted that previously.

14

THE COURT:

And he's being held on a federal hold?

15

MR. PERRY:

There's a federal hold and ho has a

16

federal attorney that's dealing with that and he wants to

17

confer with him on that.

18
19
20

THE COURT:

What do you mean the jail is not

complying with the $57,000?
MR. PERRY:

He wrote them a letter saying why

21

haven't you released me on this charge and they're saying you

22

are currently housed for $57,000 bail reinstatement on FTA.

23

MR. SWINK:

Judge --

24

MR. PERRY:

So your bail is not clear.

25

MR. SWINK:

I don't think that's accurate.

I talked
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1

with -~ first of all, let me respond this way.

2

with the jail on this matter.

3

Sergeant Terry Duncan.

4

on this $57,000 bond.

5

federal hold.

They called me

I have talked
yesterday,

She reported that he's not being held
He's met that.

But there was a

6

THE COURT:

That's what I assume was the case.

7

MR. SWINK:

That is what is holding him.

The state

would -- we won't object to the motion to continue, but we
would ask the court to withdraw the bail.

The

defendant

10

should not be released on bail for these reasons.

11

all, the defendant has a long criminal history,

12

give that to the court.

13

burglaries and thefts.

14

Salt Lake County for a retail theft.

15

before Your Honor on the 28th day of August.

16

brought him before Your Honor was that he was picked up on

17

that failure to appear and he showed up on September 11.

18

First of

Judge.

I can

There are numerous property crimes,
There was a failure to appear out of

The state has concerns, Judge.

He failed to appear
The thing that

Were we to put on the

19

evidence today, the court would see that there is a long list

20

and litany of the defendant breaking into properties.

21

evidence would show today that the defendant broke

22

into L.W.'s on Tenth North and Main Street in Logan.

23

a number of burglary tools that he was using.

24

bolt cutters, a saw that he used to try to get into an ATM.

25

He had a big mallet.

The

forcefully
He had

There were

There were a number of burglary

tools
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1

that were

2

retrieved.

He also had -- there was another burglary that night at

3

Papa Murphy's in Logan.

4

He had a duffle bag that contained CDs from that store and

5

other property belonging to them.

6

The defendant -- there's also some history in Salt Lake.

7 J There
gift
9 I

He had a computer from that store.

was

a Papa Murphy's broke into d o w n

certificates

there

he

had

from that store.

THE COURT:

Before you go to the

strength

10

evidence, what's going on in the federal court?

11

federal hold?

12

and

of

the

Why the

Is he on parole, are there charges pending?

MR. SWINK:

He's on probation with them, Judge.

13

It's a probation violation is the information I got from

14

Sergeant Duncan.

15

THE COURT:

Well, under those circumstances

the

16

defendant does not have a right to bail.

17

it be revoked will not be granted, but it will be stayed

18

temporarily.

19

until we can conduct a bail hearing.

20

not available right now.

21

I'll set a bail hearing, Mr. Perry, so we can conduct that

22

relative to his conditions of release on the $57,000 bail

23

previously set.

24
25

Your request that

There will be no release on bail

temporarily

So the $57,000 bail is

He will not be released on that.

The state has that right.

If in fact they can show,

based upon your request for a continuance, that he's not
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to fcail un der 77-2L et sequentes, then that will be

1

entitled

2

revoked

3

temporarily.

permanently

But in the meantime I'll

do that

When can we have a bail hearing?

4

THE CLERK:

Thursday.

5

THE COURT:

What time?

6

THE CLERK:

Any time m

7

THE COURT:

I'm setting that, Mr. Perry, because I

the morning.

8

assume you're not p repared to address the issues of bail

9

raised by Mr. Swink.

just

On the other hand, I think it's

10

appropriate to raise those issues of bail based upon your

11

request for a continuance today.

12

Mr. Swink suggests his evidence is sufficient to establish a

13

basis for revocation.

Absent that continuance,

14

MR. PERRY:

What tune?

15

THE CLERK:

11:00.

16

MR. SWINK:

I assume that that's the prelimmaiy

17

hearing at that time as well.

18

THE COURT:

The state has the right to proceed with

19

the preliminary hearing, Mr. Perry, and I'm not sure why

20

you're resisting that.

21

state's benefit as well.

22

I'm not sure what the delay is going to be for.

23

counsel here.

24

in the bail hearing will be largely that which I expect would

25

be presented in the preliminary hearing in any event because

The preliminary hearing is for the
They have the right to proceed.
He has

The evidence I'm going to be concerned aboit

Page S
1

the state wants to present evidence, I assume from their

2

motion, that he does not qualify for bail nor should bail be

3

granted.

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5 I

THE COURT:

May I speak, \our Honor'?

Yes.

THE DEFENDANT:

You made an order on the 11th

reinstating my bond.
THE COURT:

I'm staying that order.

THE DEFENDANT:

I understand that.

But over the

10 I last eight days have I been in federal custody or state
11 I custody 9
12

THE COURT:

I have no idea.

13

THE DEFENDANT:

Because you made that or ler does

14

that become -- does my custody become valid at th

15

that order or the time that the jail follows that order?

16

THE COURT:

I don't know, Mr. Swenson.

time of

But it

17

you're on a federal hold, it's neither here nor there, it

18

doesn't matter, because you are still in jail.

19

THE DEFENDANT:

I understand that I'm going to be in

20

jail.

I'm not trying to get out of jail.

What I'm trying Lo

21

do is postpone the state charges so I may be picked up by the

22

marshals and taken down and appointed my attorney

J
23

THE COURT:

Right.

And I T m not going to do that now

24

based upon the motion made by your attorney for a continuance

25

and based upon the representations made by Mr. Swank until we

Page 9
1

can conduct a bail hearing this Thursday.

2

THE DEFENDANT:

I understand that, sir.

I just want

3

to let everybody know I'm not trying to get out on the

4

street.

5

is to get down to the marshal's office on my marshal's hold.

6

The reason for that is I'm not going to shake this,

7

because I would like to get credit against my

8

sentence.

9

to be getting credit for the days I'm in jail.

That's not my intention in posting bail.

THE COURT:

11

THE DEFENDANT:

I would like

Are you on federal parole right now?

12

on a probation violation.

13

will be getting

14

it's

federal

I do have two years I owe the feds.

10

My intent

Yes, sir.

I'm on probation and

I will not be getting

I'm

released.

I

sentenced.

THE COURT:

I can understand why you want to get

15

down there.

On the other hand, I think a delay of the

16

preliminary hearing is detrimental to the state.

I'm not

17 I sure it's detriment to you, but it is to the state.

I'm no+-

18

sure why we shouldn't proceed with the preliminary hearing in

19

any event.

20

resetting the bail or revocation of the bail.

21

until then, the order issued earlier setting the bail at

22

$57,000 by reinstatement is stayed.

23

morning at 11:00.

24

(Hearing

25

We'll talk about that Thursday for the purpose of

concluded.)

In any event,

See you all Thursday
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C E R T I F I C A T E

5

THIS IS TO CERTIFY t h a t t h e v i d e o t a p e d h e a r i n g

6

t r a n s c r i b e d by me, Rodney M. F e l s h a w ,

7

Reporter

8

the State

9

and C e r t i f i e d
of

t r u e and c o r r e c t t r a n s c r i p t i o n

10

hearing,

11

p a g e s n u m b e r e d 2 t o 9,

12
filed

14

County,

15 |

t h e b e s t of my a b i l i t y ,

I further

13

Court Tape T r a n s c r i b e r

Court

i n and

for

Utah.

That a f u l l ,
to

a Certified

was

forth

the
in
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ANGELA F. MICK LOS. 6229
Deputy District Attorney
111 Broadwa} Centre, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

NOV '! 5 2GQ8

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD
PROSEQUENDUM

-vsCase No. 061906125
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON.
JUDGE
Defendant.
TO:

THE HONORABLE RANDALL ANDERSON, UNITED STATES MARSHAL
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, AND TO ANY OTHER UNITED STATES
MARSHAL, AND TO ANY AUTHORIZED OFFICER IN WHOSE CUSTODY THE
DEFENDANT MAY BE HELD:

GREETINGS:
WE COMMAND that you bring the body of Kendall Rosell Swenson, of whom you now
have custody and control on behalf of the Attorney General of the United States, before
Matheson Courthouse. 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Tuesday, the 21st day of
November, 2006, at 9*30 AM for Roll Call before the Honorable Judge Robert K. 1 Elder in
Courtroom S-34 of the Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, so
that said Defendant may appear therein as a defendant in the charges against him there pending;
and immediately after said Defendant's case has been heard, that \ou return said Defendant to

the institution and place wheie he was confined undei safe and secuic conduct and >ou ha\c
then and there this Wut
YOU ARE COMMANDED to setvc a certified cop> of this Wut on said Shcnlf
Superintendent, or custodian of an> institution wheiein said Defendant is now i. on fined
DATED this

/£)

dav of November. 2006
BY 71 IE COURT

/i1'<^
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Page 47
warrant; is that correct?
A. I'm sorry, repeat that again.
Q. The backup officer is the one who inquired as to the
defendant's identity and discovered the existence of the
outstanding warrant?
A. Yes.
THE COURT:

Mr. Perry, any questions?

MR. PERRY:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q. (BY MR. PERRY) The truck was loud?
A. I don't recall.
Q. The engine was running, though?
A. Yes.
Q. A diesel?
A. Yes.

I'm assuming it was a diesel.

It's a semi truck.

MR. PERRY:

No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

You may step down.

Any further

argument, Mr. Perry?
MR. PERRY:

What I'm able to gather from this

hearing is that Mr. Swenson was in custody at the time that
Officer Hansen peered through the window of the truck, broke
the plane of the truck, put his hand in the tiuck and saw the
glove and then proceeded with further detention.
THE COURT:

He was.

I would find that the defendant

24 I was in custody at the time Officer Hansen looked in the
25

truck.

He was on the ground by order of a police officer who
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had held a Tazer to him before that and turned him over to a
backup officer.

However, I also find that that stop was

justifiable.
The circumstances of this case are not with respect to
the search of the vehicle.

The circumstances that need to be

viewed by this court are whether or not the stop from a level
one to a level two to where we are now was in fact
appropriate.

Here, given all of the circumstances which this

court has to consider, we have the following.

One, the

defendant was in the location of the called in or -- the
called in burglary or the burglary alarm area.

He said he'd

been jogging north on Main Street, but he'd not been seen
doing that.

He was then seen in the truck.

As the officer

walked toward the truck he exited the truck with his hands in
the air.

No reasonable person would do that under the

circumstances of the facts I've heard, unless there was some
concern about his being there inappropriately.
He then did not stop when told to by the officer.
at that point he was told to sit on the ground.
point he was in custody.

It was

At that

This court, however, finds under

the circumstances attendant in the officer's mind there was
nothing inappropriate about that action.
justifiable.

That was

It's articulable suspicion of the defendant.

And the officer had every right to hold him and further
inquire relative to his presence there and his actions.

The
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actual inquiry took place by the hand of another officer and
once the warrant was discovered the matter is resolved.
As a matter of fact, apparently the glove being
discovered is only incidental to the other articulable
circumstances.

Nor do I find that looking through the window

and seeing the gloves and identifying those as consistent
with those at the scene are necessarily inappropriate.

But

that occurred after the defendant was already in custody.
The defendant was already in custody when Officer Hansen
looked through the window.
I would find that there was articulable suspicion to
continue that custodial arrangement until further
investigation occurred, which was then buttressed by him
looking through the window.

But more importantly, then,

confirmed by the search -- by the arrest warrant being
discovered.
So, irrespective of whether the glove was seen or not
seen

by Officer Hansen,

the

defendant was already in custody

of the police officers, already legally in custody, and
constitutionally in custody.

And once the existence of the

warrant was discovered anything thereafter was a search
incident to an arrest, sufficient for an inventory purpose
and consistent with further investigation of the burglary of
the service station.
MR. PERRY:

Motion to suppress is denied.
Your Honor, the next motion is the
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A TTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

# f

1 Date Filed

Docket Text

|

1

1 1Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed, assigned to Judge Bruce S.

103/12/2001

1

2

104/09/2001

1

103/09/2001

Jenkins Receipt no.: 110843 (Entered: 03/12/2001)

|

by Charles Dennis Friedman for appointment of counsel
I Motion
(Entered: 03/12/2001)
3 Order of Reference signed by JTG (in the temporaiy absence of Judge
I Jenkins) 4/9/01, 636(b)(1)(A). The magistrate is to hear and determine

J
j

the pending petition for habeas corpus and should hold an expedited hrg
before 4/13/01 (which is the day the state court has indicated its inlent to
sentence the petnr on state charges), cc: atty (ce) (Entered: 04/09/2001)
104/09/2001

1

104/09/2001

1

4

referred to Judge Ronald N. Bovce cc: art)' (ce) (Entered:
I Case
04/09/2001)
'

J
1

Case referred to magistrate under 28:636(b)(l)(A). (ce) (Entered:
04/09/2001)

|

1 04/09/2001

5 Order granting [2-1] motion for appointment of couns* 1 signed by Tudge
Bruce S. Jenkins, 4/6/01. Deirdre A. Gorman is appt c lsl for petnr.
cc:atty (ce) (Entered- 04/09/2001)
J

1 04/10/2001

6 Magistrate Notice of Hearing status conference set for 10:30 4/13/01 To
be held before Judge Boyce cc:atty (Ntc generated by: RNB's chambers)
(ce) (Entered: 04/10/2001)
|

1 04/10/2001

7 Order of Reference signed by JTG, 4/10/01, 636(b)(1)(B). Mag to handle 1
case up to and incl R&R on any dispositive matters. The mag should hold
an expedited hrg before 4/13/01, the date the State court has indicated its
intent to sentence the petnr on state charges, cc: atty (ce) (Entered:
1 04/11/2001)
J

1

8

1 04/13/2001

1

9

1 04/20/2001

1—

1 04/12/2001

Request for Ruling by petitioner Charles Dennis Friedman RE: [2-1 ]
| motion for appointment of counsel (alt) (Entered: 04/12/2001)

Minute entry. Counsel for both parties present. Based upon the
information by Ms. Gorman regarding the status of the petitioner in the
state court system, the court will recommend that the petition for writ of 1
habeas corpus under 28:2254 be dismissed without prejudice for being
filed prematurely. Petition has been filed without exhausting all of the
state remedies. A report and recommendation will be prepared and
1 submitted to Judge Jenkins expeditiously. Court adjourned, status
conference : Judge: Ronald N. Boyce Court Reporter: Electronic Tape
No.: 2052 & 2053 Log 6075-223 Court Deputy: Arindrea Bowers (asb)
j (Entered: 04/13/2001)
J
Report and Recommendations of Judge Ronald N. Boyce. The court
recommends that the Petition for Habeas corpus of Charles Friedman
should be Dismissed w/o prejudice, for his failure to exhaust his state

https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl7224996427059363-L_923_0-1
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remedies. Objections to R and R due by 5/3/01 cc:atty (ksp) (Entered:
04/23/2001)
105/01/2001

11 1Order adopting [10-1] report and recommendations, dismissing case

1

signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins. 5/1/01 cc:attv (alt) (Entered:
05/01/2001)

1
1
1
|

105/01/2001

1

CASE NO LONGER REFERRED TO Judge Ronald N. Boyce (alt)
(Entered: 05/01/2001)

105/01/2001

|

Case closed per order no. 11 (alt) (Entered: 05/23/2001)

105/02/2001

1

12 1Obj ections by Charles Dennis Friedman [10-1] report and

1
|

recommendations (alt) (Entered: 05/04/2001)
105/02/2001

J

13 1Request for evidentiary hrg filed by Charles Dennis Friedman re: [1-1]

1

petition (alt) (Entered: 05/04/2001)

|

14] Motion by Charles Dennis Friedman to stay all state ct proceedings

1 05/02/2001

concerning Petitioner pending final determination of his Petition (alt)
(Entered: 05/04/2001)

j

1 05/07/2001

15 Notice of Hearing filed: Motion hearing set for 2:00 5/18/01 for [14-1]
motion to stay all state ct proceedings concerning Petitioner pending final
determination of his Petition To be held before Judge BSJ cc:atty (Ntc
generated by: BSJ's secy, KS) (alt) (Entered: 05/07/2001)
]

1 05/10/2001

16 Motion by Charles Dennis Friedman to vacate [11-1] order dismissing
case (alt) (Entered: 05/10/2001)

12 Motion by Charles Dennis Friedman for issuance of subps to Dep. Martin

1 05/10/2001

Monks & Lana Taylor, Esq. for hrg scheduled 5/18/01 at 2:00 (alt)
(Entered: 05/10/2001)

1 05/11/2001

1 05/11/2001

1 05/17/2001
1 05/17/2001
1 05/18/2001

|

1
1
1

1
1

|

granting [17-1] motion for issuance of subps to Dep. Martin
~ Order
Monks & Lana Taylor, Esq. for hrg scheduled 5/18/01 at 2:00 signed by

~

1 Judge Ronald N. Boyce, 5/11/01 cc:atty (alt) (Entered: 05/14/2001)

|

Memorandum by Aaron D. Kennard in opposition to [14-1 ] motion to
stay all state ct proceedings concerning Petitioner pending final
determination of his Petition, also in obj to [1 -1 ] petition for habeas
1 corpus (alt) (Entered: 05/14/2001)

|

20 Return of service executed re: subp served upon Deputy Martin Munks

Z1

J 5/16/01 (alt) (Entered: 05/17/2001)

|

Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum issued (mrw) (Entered:

105/18/2001)

|

22 Order granting [16-1] motion to vacate [11-1] order dismissing case
signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins, 5/18/01 cc:atty (alt) (Entered:

105/21/2001)
1 05/18/2001

1

1

23 J Minute entry: Petitioner, Chrles Friedman present on Writ of HC Ad
Test. Argument & discussion heard. Witness(es) called, sworn, & testify.

1
https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl7224996427059363-L 923 0-1
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Evidence marked, offered, & received. Cross-examination. Crt rules:
granting [16-1] motion to vacate [11-1] order dismissing case; mooting
[14-1] motion to stay all state ct proceedings concerning Petitioner
pending final determination of his Petition, By stip of cnsl, Crt deems
I
matters as on Writ of HC. Parties have agreed upon matters to be decided
by the Crt. , By stip of cnsl, documentation received as evidence., Dft
appropriately in federal custody & State of Utah will have to Writ out of
federal custody for further proceedings Crt has not dealt with credit for
time served issue. Ms. Gorman to prepare & submit order. Defendant,
Charles Friedman deemed in Primary Custody effective 2/13/2000,
pending final execution & return of Judgment and Commitment. Judge:
BSJ Court Reporter: Reeve Butler Court Deputy: Michael R. Weiler
(mrw) (Entered: 05/22/2001)
|

1 05/18/2001

23 Order, Defendant, Charles Friedman deemed in Primary Custody
(federal) effective Febaruary 13th, 2000, pending final execution and
return of Judgment and Commitment signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins ,
5/18/2001 cc:atty (mrw) (Entered: 05/22/2001)
J

1 05/18/2001

Petitioner's Exliibits 1 & 2 (see Min Entry docket #23) lodged on left-side
of case record (mrw) (Entered: 05/22/2001)

| 05/18/2001

Case reopened per order no. 22 (alt) (Entered: 05/23/2001)

1 05/21/2001

1

24 Writ of HC ad testificandum executed re: Charles D. Friedman, 5/18/01. J
(alt) (Entered: 05/23/2001)

1 07/02/2001

J

25 Findings of fact and conclusions of law re: primary' custody signed by
Judge Bruce S. Jenkins, 6/29/01 cc:atty (alt) (Entered: 07/02/2001)

1 07/02/2001

1

|

26 Order that Pet be deemed in primary federal custody since 2/13/00; that
Pet is now properly in physical custody of USMS & is a federal prisoner;
the UT, to process st cakrges against Pet, must follow proper procedures
& writ Pet out of federal custody & then return him to primary custody of
USMS signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins, 6/29/01 cc:atty (alt) (Enlered:

107/02/2001)
| 07/10/2001
111/08/2001

"

J

Case closed per chmbrs, re: order no. 26 (alt) (Entered: 07/10/2001)

1

27 CJA 20 Authorization to Pay Deirdre A. Gorman $5,050.89 Voucher No.
010803000158 (Signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins 10/31/01) (alt)
(Entered: 11/13/2001)

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt

J

10/16/2006 12.07.23
[PACER Login: [dg0538
~_^[Client Code:
]
[Docket Report [[Search Criteria: [|2:01-cv -00158-BSJj
[Description:
[BillablePages: [3
[Cost:
1^24 "

I
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Case 2:01-cv-00158-BSJ

Document 25

DF.1RDRK A GORMAN ("3651) of
FARR, KAUFMAN. SIJ1.UVAN, GORMAN.
JENSF.N, MFDRKER, NICHOLS & PERKINS
Attorneys tor Petitioner
205 26* Street, Suite 34
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone (S01) 394-5526

Filed 07/02/2001
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IN TKE \ JNITED STATES DISTRICT C O l ' j ^ ! C £ c).
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
CHARLES DENNIS FRIEDMAN,
/

FINDINGS Or FACT AND
CONCI .USIONS OF I .AW

Petitioner,
/
vs.

AARON D. KENNARD,

Case No. 01 CV 15,- J

Respondent.
This matter was heard on May 18. 2001. pursuant to Petitioner's request for an
evidentiary hearing Petitioner CHARLES DFNNIS FRIEDMAN was present with eoumel
DEIRDRFA GORMAN Respondent wasnot present hut represented by counsel T .1 TSAKALOS.
The Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus The Magistrate
made a preliminary finding recommending that Petitioner's request for a writ be dcr ted Pet ilioner,
through appointed counsel filed an objection to the Magistrate's recommendation. The Respondent
filed an objection to the Petitioner's request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

#

Case 2:01 -cv-00158-BSJ

Document 25

Filed 07/02/2001
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FRIEDMANV KENNARD -CaseNo 01 CV 158J
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofhaw
The Court, having taken lesti mony, hearing proffers and argument by the parties, and
admitting exhibits submitted by the Pet i tinner, now makes the following Findings of Fact.
1. That the prior Order of Dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
vacated.
2. That the parties agree thai the issues would not change i flhc technical procedures
were complied with and agree that the Court may deem the pleadings submitted by ihe Petitioner
as if Ihey were in the nature ofa Writ oTHabeas Corpus and the Answer and Objection (lied by the
Respondent arc as ifthey were a Return
3. That the parties have requested that the Court, having this matter before n. decide
the issue based upon the record
4. The parties agree that the documents prepared by counselor for Petitioner,
Exhibits 1 and 2, be received in evidence as factually accurate.
CONCLUSIONS OF 1 AW
1. That the Petitioner was appropriaiely wriledout of State custody for the purposes
o f a proceeding in the United Stales Dislnct Court, before the Honorable Thomas Greene, on
September 27, 1999, At that time, the Petitioner had been convicted ofa state charge of escape on
August 26, 1999, and had been sentenced pursuant to that conviction for a one year period
2, When the Petitioner was sentenced on October 17,2000, by United States District
Court Judge Thomas Greene, to a period of 71 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, the
state term had expired by operation of law on February 13, 2000,

?

Case 2:01-cv~00158-BSJ

Document 25

Filed 07/02/2001
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FRIFDMAN V. KF.NNARD -CaseNo. 01 CV 158J
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I,aw
3. That the primary custody of the Petitioner on October 17, 2000 was that of the
United States.
4 That although the Petitioner was improperly relumed to the physical custody of
the State ofUtah at the time his federal sentence was imposed, the primary custody of the Petitioner
remained with the United States.
5. That the State olTJteh, to appropriately process the state charges, needs to writ
out the .Petitioner from federal custody and then return Petitioner to the primary custodian of the
United States.
6, The Court has deah only with the question of the proper primary custody of the
Petitioner.
DATED this 9Jf

day of June, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

U.S. DlSTRTO^cW
Approved as to form;

T.jfiTSAKALOS
Attorney for Respondent

/
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FRIEDMAN V, KENNARD - Case No. 01 CV 158J
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following, postage prepaid this / f day of
June, 2001:
T.J. Tsakalos
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street, tfS3400
Salt Lake City, UT 84190
Secretary

t41
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Utah Statutes
G
Cl
Q

Utah Statutes
TITLE 77 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 29 DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

77-29-5.
I n t e r s t a t e a g r e e m e n t on d e t a i n e r s — Enactment i n t o
— Text of agreement.

law

The i n t e r s t a t e a g r e e m e n t on d e t a i n e r s i s h e r e b y e n a c t e d i n t o 3 aw a n d
e n t e r e d i n t o by t h i s s t a t e w i t h a l l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s l e g a l L y j o i n i n g
t h e r e i n m t h e form s u b s t a n t i a l l y a s f o l l o w s :
The c o n t r a c t i n g

states

solemnly agree

that:

ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner,
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and
difficulties m securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in
other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of
the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of
the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments,
informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings
with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another
jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative
procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such
co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used m

this agreement:

(a)
"State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b)
"Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is
incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final
dispositions pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request
for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c)
"Receiving state" shall mean the state m which tria L is to be had
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or
Article IV hereof.
ARTICIE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment m a
penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during
the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending m any other
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his

1
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imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a
certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner,
stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held,
the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the
sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to
the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to
in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of
him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the
appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and
contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of
his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment,
information or complaint on which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disporition of
all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically
directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official
having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate
prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions wi.-hin the
state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent
of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent
pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the
prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior
to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to
the production of his body in any court where his presence may be
required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a
further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing
in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence
if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof
shall void the request.
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ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with
Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary
custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having
jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate
authorities before the request be honored, within which period the
governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary
custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the
prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in
paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in
custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said
authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers
against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing
them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons
therefor.
(c)
In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial
shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arriva' of the
prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court,
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction
of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his
delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not
be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the
sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such
delivery.
(e)
If trial is not had on any indictment, information oi complaint
contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the
original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV
hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to
deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority
in the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending
against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be
had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the
offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided
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for m Article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner,
the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to
temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's
presence m federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial
arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a stare accepting an offer
of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A auly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint
on the basis or which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept
temporary custody of said person, or m the event that an action on the
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer
has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided
m
Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the
jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been
pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any
detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.
(d) The temporary custody referred to m this agreement shall be only
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges
contained m one or more untried indictments, informations or c c m p l a m t s
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or tor prosecution on
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction
Except
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in
a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting
prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of
this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this
agreement, time oeing served on the sentence shall continue to iun but
good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent
that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence
may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending
state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or m any
other manner permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner
pursuant ro this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the
territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or
more untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or m
which trial is bexng had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall
also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the
prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states
concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for
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a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among
themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or
affect any internal relationship among the departments, agendes and
officers of and m the government of a party state, or between a party
state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or
responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining tne duration and expiration dates of the 1 lme
periods provided m Articles III and J V of this agreement, the running of
said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the
prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally
ill.
ARTICLE VII
Each stare party to this agreement shall designate an officer who,
acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and
provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without
the state, information necessary to the effective operation of ihis
agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party
state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state pa^ty to
this agreement may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the
same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of
any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officeis at the
time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect t h e n rights
m
respect thereof.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its
purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States
or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, perscn ^r
circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder cf
his
agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person
or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be
held contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the
agreement shall remain m full force and effect as to the remaining
states and m
full force and effect as to the state affected as to all
severable matters.
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